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Articles
Embryo Culture and the "Culture of Life":
Constitutional Issues in the Embryonic Stem Cell
Debate
John A. Robertsont
The "culture of life" debate has been a powerful force in
recent American law and politics. It influences the choice of
Supreme Court justices and inspires sanctions on doctors who
legally prescribe drugs for assisted suicide. Like an erupting
volcano, it drove the extraordinary attempt by Congress in 2005
to overturn Florida court decisions that allowed Teri Schiavo's
husband to remove her feeding tube.'
The embryonic stem cell controversy, another battleground
in the "culture of life" wars, has potentially even greater
significance for people's lives. The ability to culture human
embryonic stem cells ("ESCs") in the laboratory has opened the
door to cell replacement treatments for a wide range of diseases.
The need, however, to destroy embryos to obtain ESCs has mired
scientific progress in the trenches of yet another pitched battle
between the "culture of life" and the "culture of death."2
t Vinson & Elkins Chair in Law, University of Texas at Austin. The author is
grateful for comments on an earlier draft presented at the University of Chicago Legal
Forum Symposium and the University of Texas Law School Colloquium.
1 For an account of those issues, see John A. Robertson, The (In)Significance of
Schiavo, 35 Stetson L Rev 101, 103-04 (2005).
2 These terms are shibboleths for positions on such issues of life and death as
abortion, contraception, euthanasia, and assisted suicide. Despite the vagueness of the
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Opposition to embryonic stem cell research and therapy could
block the promise of embryonic stem cell science for millions of
persons.'
In the United States, the debate over ESCs has unfolded
more as a conflict over federal funding of research, and less as a
direct prohibition on their derivation or use. But funding
prohibitions are a powerful brake on the pace of research,
particularly when this brake prevents the National Institutes of
Health ("NIH") from playing its traditional role of supporting
research that is too far upstream from marketable products to
attract private investment.4 In addition, some states directly
prohibit embryo research,5 and an effort to ban the use of ESC
products made through nuclear transfer cloning passed the US
House of Representatives by a wide margin.6
The focus of the United States debate on federal funding, so
different from European and Asian debates over ESC policy,
arose from President Bush's 2001 decision to permit ESC
research funding only with cell lines then already in existence.7
Originally touted as making 66 lines available for researchers, in
reality only 22 cell lines qualified under the Bush policy.8 It
became rapidly clear that many more lines would be needed to
accelerate the science and yield its therapeutic potential. Not
only were the original lines contaminated by mouse viruses,9 but
terms, they have figured prominently in the legal, policy, and cultural wars surrounding
the ESC debate. Consider George Lakoff, Moral Politics 222-44 (Chicago 1996)
(discussing liberal and conservative framing of controversial moral issues).
3 Opponents of ESC research are not against medical research per se, but are
against using ESCs to do it. President's Council on Bioethics, Monitoring Stem Cell
Research 58-60 (2004).
4 Uncertainty about the scope of governmental restrictions on future uses also
dampens the flow of private funds. See Ronald M. Green and Robert Lanza, Letter:
Bush's Policy Stopped US Gaining Stem Cell Lead, 438 Nature 401, 422 (2005) (noting
that President Bush's restrictive policy on funding stem-cell research created "an
extremely hostile funding environment, with no hope of federal support" for private
companies engaged in stem-cell research).
5 See, for example, 720 ILCS 510/6, 510/12-1 (West 2005) (prohibiting research on
live embryos); Mich Comp Laws Ann §§ 333.2687-2688 (West 2006) (prohibiting research
on live embryos).
6 HR 1357, 109th Cong, 1st Sess H1690 (2005).
7 President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Stem Cell Research (Aug
9, 2001), available at <http'//www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/print/20010809-
2.html> (last visited Apr 19, 2006).
8 National Institutes of Health, Information on Eh'gibility Criteria for Federal
Funding of Research on Human Embryonic Stem Cells, available at
<http'//stemcells.nih.gov/research/registry/ eligibilityCriteria.asp> (last visited Apr 19,
2006).
9 Emma Young, Stem Cells Face Xenotransplantation Glitch, New Scientist (Aug 24,
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the few genotypes represented could hardly serve as models for
the many different diseases that the ESC platform promised to
treat. The creation of new ESCs through nuclear transfer to deal
with immune system rejection also appeared necessary as
research moved into the clinic.
"Culture of life" politics, however, has stymied relaxation of
federal funding restrictions. With the Bush administration
recalcitrant on more funding, the battle shifted to the halls of
Congress. A 50 vote majority of the House in 2005 passed a bill
that would lift the administration's time limits on ESC funding,
though it left standing the Dickey Amendment ban on federal
funding of ESC derivation itself.1° The bill is slated for a vote in
2006 in the Senate. Majority Leader Bill Frist and several
centrist Republicans have announced their support." The Senate
voted approval on July 17, 2006, but President Bush quickly
vetoed the bill and the House of Representatives sustained the
veto by 51 votes.12
With federal funding blocked by "culture of life" politics, a
few states have taken the lead to fill the funding gap, most
notably California. Proposition 71, a referendum passed in 2004
at a time of budget deficits, has allocated $3 billion over 10 years
to ESC research. 3 Several other states, impelled as much by
competition for biotech jobs and research dollars as for the
health of their citizens, have also appropriated funds. While
every bit of research funding helps, in the long run state efforts
are not likely to replace the steam lost by denying NIH a major
role in ESC science. In the meantime foreign competitors, most
notably the United Kingdom and the Asian tigers-South Korea,
2001), available at <http//www.newscientist.com/ article/dnll96.html> (last visited Apr
20, 2006).
10 Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2005, HR Rep No 810, 109th Cong, 2d
Sess H627 (2005). The text of the Dickey Amendment, named after former
Representative Jay Dickey of Arkansas, can be found in each year's Labor/DHSS
Appropriations Bill. The original version is in section 128 of the Balanced Budget
Downpayment Act, I, Pub L No 104-99, 110 Stat 26 (1996).
11 Fist's Support of Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act Increases Chances of
Senate Passage; Bush Veto Threat Remains, Medical News Today (Aug 2, 2005),
available at <http'//www.medicalnewstoday.com/ medicalnews.php?newsid=28473> (last
visited Apr 20, 2005).
12 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, First Bush Veto Maintains Limits on Stem Cell Use, NY
Times, July 20, 2006 p. Al.
13 Cal Const Art XXXV § 5.
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Singapore, and China-will move the science along, but not
nearly as rapidly as a full United States commitment would.14
I. PUBLIC POLICY AND ESC TREATMENTS
With ESC science still undeveloped, the public debate has
necessarily focused on research, not treatment, issues. Many
scientific issues about ESCs require elucidation, including the
factors that keep ESCs in a pluripotent state; the signals that
drive them to differentiate; the genes that control the particular
lineages that they express; conditions of safe and efficacious use;
the viability of nuclear transfer cloning; and many other
questions that any clinical science, especially one with the range
of the ESC platform, must answer to mature and enter
mainstream medical practice.
No schedule exists for when each stage of development will
conclude. Phase I clinical trials for ESC treatment of spinal cord
injuries appear imminent, but most other touted uses are much
farther off. There is no reason why ESCs should provide
therapies more quickly than the 15-20 years needed for small
molecule drug therapies and the longer time frame needed to
bring monoclonal antibodies and gene therapies into the medical
marketplace.'" Even without ESC products as such, ESC science
will make important contributions to understanding the
pathogenesis of disease and thus aid the development of disease
therapy.16
At some point, however, the "culture of life" issues
animating the ESC research debate will have to be faced in the
context of ESC-derived therapies. ESC policy has been a heated
issue precisely because the prospect of treating millions of
14 Clive Cookson, et al, The Future of Stem Cells, Scientific Am A20-23 (2005). The
scandal surrounding Dr. Hwang Suk Woo's non-existent cloned cell lines may set back
the Korean effort, but should not stop the field from going forward. Nicholas Wade and
Choe Sang-Hun, Human Cloning Was All Faked, Korea Reports, NY Times Al (Jan 10,
2006) (reporting the revelation that Dr. Hwang Suk Woo's claims were indeed
fraudulent). His fraud involved successful performance of a mechanical technique, not a
scientific insight on which other research depended.
15 Patricia Robuck and John Wurzelmann, Understanding the Drug Development
Process, Inflamm Bowel Dis 11 Supp 1:S13-16 (Nov 2005) (citing Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America, Pharmaceutical Industry Profile 2005 (March,
2005)).
16 Adult stem cell science, for example, has exploded under the impetus of ESC
research. NIH, Stem Cells and Diseases, available at <http.//stemcells.nih.gov/
info/health.asp> (last visited Apr 19 2006) (explaining how adult stem cell research helps
understand disease).
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patients has hovered over the warring parties. Because so much
of the debate has revolved around research, with claims about
what the research might lead to and whether it is necessary,
much less attention has been paid to how the "culture of life"
debate now centered on embryo research would play out if, in
fact, ESCs were shown to have therapeutic benefit. Such effects
might be shown in animal studies and then in clinical trials with
humans in countries that are more hospitable to ESC research,
such as the United Kingdom, Singapore, or South Korea. 7
At that point, "culture of life" opposition may fade away.
Just as there are said to be no atheists in foxholes, there may be
few embryo protectionists willing to prevent clinical use of
effective treatments. Supporters of the "culture of life" might
quickly switch allegiance and recognize, as their opponents have
long argued, that a person best respects life by using leftover or
created embryos to provide treatments that extend life or reduce
pain and disability in born persons.
It may, however, be overly sanguine to expect a therapeutic
conversion of those who have battled so hard against ESC
research. "Culture of life" battalions are too deeply entrenched in
their beliefs to switch course once therapeutic benefits are
shown, though moderate opponents may shift from erecting legal
barriers to other means of marking their opposition. Continuing
questions about ESC efficacy, particularly if they or their
families will not directly benefit, will also delay a rush to accept
ESC therapies. Even if Congress or the states permit treatment
with private funds, they might restrict Medicare or Medicaid
funding, just as the Hyde Amendment bars federal support of
abortions. 8 Having stalwartly opposed ESC research despite its
great promise, there is no reason why their position should
change once treatments exist.
Opposition to ESC-derived therapies may also vary with the
extent of embryo destruction required by the therapies. While
more moderate opponents might accept the use of therapies
derived from surplus embryos from infertility treatments, they
might still try to ban the creation of research embryos or at least
the use of federal funding for those purposes. 9 Yet those
17 Ella De Trizio and Christopher S. Brennan, The Business of Human Embryonic
Stem Cell Research and an International Analysis ofRelevant Laws, 7 J Biolaw & Bus 4,
5-7 (2004).
18 42 USC § 1396.
19 This line is drawn by Senate Majority leader Bill Frist to demarcate his differences
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procedures might be essential to obtain the ESC lines or
derivative cells and products that are used in therapy.2"
In addition to restrictions on public funding of some or all
ESC therapies, legislatures might criminalize the creation of
embryos needed for effective stem cell therapy, such as the
creation of embryos by nuclear transfer to obtain histocompatible
ESC progenitor cells. Seven states already have laws that make
it a crime to engage in nuclear transfer cloning, whether for
research or therapy, and more might join them.2' The US House
of Representatives in 2005 passed by a large margin a bill that
would make it a crime not only to engage in nuclear transfer
cloning for research or therapy, but also to ship, transport, or
receive any products derived from cloning.22 This ban would
extend to ESCs themselves, as well as the cellular and other
products derived from them, including downstream progenitor
cells and replacement tissue, and possibly even drugs directly
developed from ESC research.23
Even if the hard-core "culture of life" base does not succeed
in banning nuclear transfer or embryo creation as such,
opponents might wield enough political clout to ban the
payments to the oocyte donors that are likely to be needed to
obtain immunocompetent ESCs. Two states already make paying
egg donors a crime,24 and few countries in the world outside of
with President Bush. See Letter from Jaydee Hanson, Director of Human Genetics Policy,
International Center for Technology Assessment (Aug 5, 2005), available at <http:'/www.
icta.org/doc/August%205,%202005%2OUpdate.pdf> (last visited Apr 19 2006) (discussing
possible lines to be drawn in the ESC debate).
20 Other alternatives would include a library of representative ESC types,
immunosuppression, or cellular engineering to remove antigens. See Ruth Faden, et al,
Public Stem Cell Banks: Considerations of Justice in Stem Cell Research and Therapy, 33
Hastings Ctr Rep 13, 13-16 (2003).
21 Ark Code Ann §§ 20-17-802, 20-16-1001 to 1004; Ind Code § 35-46-5-1 (2005); Iowa
Code §§ 707B.1-4; Mich Comp Laws §§ 333.16274-16275, 333.20197, 333.26401-26403,
750.430a (2006); ND Cent Code § 14-02.2-02 (2006); SD Code Laws §§ 34-14-16, 17, 20,
34-23A-17 (2006); Va Code Ann § 32.1-162.22 (2006). These include states with important
biotech medical centers and infrastructure, such as Michigan, Indiana, and Iowa. See
National Conference of State Legislatures, State Embryonic and Fetal Research Laws,
available at <http'//www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/embfet.htm> (last visited Feb
14, 2006) (listing the states that have made it a crime to engage in nuclear transfer
cloning).
22 HR 1357, 109th Cong, 1st Sess H1690 (2005).
23 See generally, Adrienne N. Cash, Attack of the Clones: Legislative Approaches to
Human Cloningin the United States, 26 Duke L & Tech J 1 (2005).
24 Cal Health & Safety §§ 125290.35 ("prohibiting compensation to research donors or
participants, while permitting reimbursement of expenses"); Mass Gen Laws Ann l11L
§ 8 (2005) (no "valuable consideration purchase, sell, transfer or otherwise obtain human
embryos, gametes, or cadaveric tissue for research purposes").
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the United States permit it.25 If patients or researchers are
forced to rely on unpaid volunteers, they will live at the mercy of
altruistic strangers or the fortuity of having female family
members of reproductive age who are willing to donate.
In this Article, I put aside further discussion of federal
funding policy for ESC research and therapy. These are
quintessentially policy questions to be decided by the political
process. As the abortion funding cases made clear, in positive
law there is no constitutional right to have either basic needs or
the exercise of constitutional rights funded.26 Moral objections
might then block Congress from providing Medicare and
Medicaid coverage of ESC therapies as well. Legislatures and
administrative agencies will make these decisions by the
prevailing political lights with little judicial oversight. However,
a greater role for the judiciary could arise from direct bans on
privately funded ESC therapies or on the research necessary to
produce them.
II. Is THERE A RIGHT TO MEDICAL TREATMENT?
Conflicts over a "culture of life" will continue to arise from
scientific and clinical uses of the earliest stages of human life.
While many of these conflicts will, like funding decisions, be
institutionally allocated to legislatures, others will touch more
closely the rights-claims traditionally entertained by courts. It is
instructive to view how constitutional discourse would frame
these issues, both to sharpen our view of the moral conflicts at
stake and to identify the institutional arrangements likely to
constrain or to facilitate scientific innovation.
In the debate over use of ESC therapies, ESC supporters
might plausibly argue that a ban on the use of ESC therapies
that will save lives or ameliorate pain and disability would
violate a person's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to life
and liberty." A negative right against governmental interference
25 See Nigel M de S Cameron, Light From the North: Canada Comprehensively Ban
Human Cloning, Ethics & Medicine (Summer 2004) (discussing a Canandian law to
proscribe the selling of embryos and other human tissue along the same lines as
resolutions passed by the United Nations).
26 Rust v Sullivan, 500 US 173 (1991); McCrae v Harris, 448 US 297 (1980); Maher v
Roe, 432 US 464 (1977). For a general discussion of the constitutional status of basic
needs, see William Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and
Reconstruction, 69 Fordham L Rev 1821 (2001) (defining basic needs and describing a
variety of descriptive and normative views on constitutional protection of basic needs).
27 A similar argument could be made in opposition to bans on the use of fetal tissue
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with therapy is claimed, not a positive right to state resources. In
essence the claim is that the right against deprivation of "life
[and] liberty ... without due process of law" is most coherently
construed as including a person's right to have safe and effective
medical treatments paid for with her own funds.28 Although the
Court has never explicitly recognized such a right, some form of
it should follow from text, precedent, and other standard moves
in constitutional interpretation.29
Making such a move, of course, does force yet another
confrontation over whether judges are "making" or "interpreting"
law in substantive due process adjudication, thus tripping
another iteration of the contemporary debate over judicial
activism and deference to legislatures. As a result, courts may be
hesitant to overrule the will of legislatures strongly committed to
"culture of life" policies.
Yet the Supreme Court has long found unenumerated rights
to be part of substantive due process, disagreeing only over how
broad or specific those derived rights are and to what extent they
depend on precisely specified traditions of recognized rights or
can be derived from more general conceptions of liberty. The
more conservative view holds that substantive due process rights
must be "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"
and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" such that "neither
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed." ° In
addition, "a careful description of the asserted fundamental
liberty interest" is required, using "our nation's history, legal
traditions, and practices ... as guideposts for responsible
decisionmaking" in order to rein in "the subjective elements that
are necessarily present in due-process review.""1 Less demanding
or organs for therapy, such as the federal law that now prohibits any use of fetal tissue or
organs donated to family members. See John A. Robertson, Abortion to Obtain Fetal
Tissue for Transpant 27 Suffolk U L Rev 1359, 1368-69 (1993) (discussing constitutional
status of statutory restrictions).
28 US Const Amend V, cl 3; US Const Amend XIV, § 1.
29 Justice Souter, for example, calls this right the "traditional right to medical care
and counsel." Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 781 (1997). Justice Breyer, on the
other hand, talks about the "personal control over the manner of death, professional
medical assistance, and the avoidance of unnecessary and severe medical pain and
suffering." Id at 790. Both views agree with Chief Justice Rehnquist that "It cannot be
disputed that the due process clause protects an interest in life ... ." Cruzan v Director,
Missoui Department ofHealth, 497 US 261, 281 (1990).
30 Glucksberg, 521 US at 721 (Rehnquist), citing Palko v Connecticut, 302 US 319,
325-36 (1937) and Moore v City of East Cleveland, 431 US 494, 503 (1977).
31 Glucksberg, 521 US at 721-22 (Rehnquist), citing Reno v Fores, 507 US 292, 302
(1993) and Colh'ns v Harker Heights, 503 US 115, 125 (1992).
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versions of substantive due process identification of fundamental
rights would derive the right to medical treatment directly from
the autonomy of individuals.32
A. Life and the Logic of Rights
The argument for a right to medical treatment is anchored
by text, logic, tradition, and precedent. The Constitution
explicitly protects "life" and "liberty," 13 which the Court has
construed to mean protection against state deprivation without
at least a rational or even compelling justification. As Chief
Justice Rehnquist noted in Cruzan, "It cannot be disputed that
the due process clause protects an interest in life ....
Logic strongly supports finding a right to medical
treatments that save or extend life, since being alive is a
necessary precondition to the exercise of other rights. A right to
sexual or reproductive autonomy, to raise children, to practice a
religion, to participate in politics, or to pursue any right or
interest depends on possessing life itself. It would be surprising
if state action that diminished the ability to stay alive did not
receive the same scrutiny as infringement of the more particular
rights which being alive makes possible. Because life is a
primary good on which realizing all other goods depends, it
should have at least the same protection as is given to those
secondary goods. State deprivation of life, therefore, should
32 Such a view is well represented by the plurality opinion in Casey v Planned
Parenthood, 505 US 833 (1992): "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and the mystery of human life. Beliefs
about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State." Id at 851. See also Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558, 574 (2003);
Steven Goldberg, Cloning Matters: How Lawrence v. Texas Protects Therapeutic
Research, 4 Yale J Health Pol L & Ethics 305, 314-15 (2004) (arguing Lawrencds ban on
moral repugnance as a rational ground for proscribing same-sex sodomy also invalidates
it as a valid ground for restricting other protected liberties).
33 US Const Amend XIV, § 1.
3 See note 29. The quote continues: "as well as an interest in refusing life-sustaining
treatment." Cruzan, 497 US at 281.
35 John Rawls' term "natural primary good" would include life and health because
they are necessary preconditions to realizing all other goods. John Rawls, A Theory of
Justice 62 (Harvard 1971) ("Other primary goods, such as health and vigor, intelligence
and imagination, are natural goods; although their possession is influenced by the basic
structure, they are not so directly under its control."). One might think of free speech
rights as a constitutional "primary good," since freedom of thought and speech has been
described as "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of
[freedom]." Palko, 302 US at 326-27. Yet it too cannot exist unless a person is alive and in
sufficient health to exercise that freedom.
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require at least as strong a justification as is needed for
depriving a person of other fundamental liberties. 6
While life is a necessary condition for the exercise of rights,
it may not be sufficient. One cannot pursue other liberty
interests if one is unable to participate in ordinary life activities
due to severe disability or pain. Thus the right to use safe and
effective medical treatments could also be grounded in liberty
rights to be free of pain or disability.37 As at least five justices
voting in Washington v Glucksberg8 to uphold a state ban on
physician-assisted suicide noted, their support assumed that
terminal sedation and analgesics that might themselves hasten
death were available to control the pain of dying patients. 9 If
not, a person's liberty right to be free of pain would dwarf the
more general concerns about the vulnerability of the poor and
incompetent, slippery slopes, and medical ethics that provided
facial support for the state's ban on assisted suicide. If so, access
to safe and effective ESC-derived therapies should be
presumptively protected regardless of whether they saved life or
only lessened pain and suffering, as many of them are likely to
do.
B. History and Tradition
Unless explicit specificity is required, a right to use safe and
effective medical treatments to extend life or reduce pain and
disability could also cogently be said to be "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition."4 ° The right of doctors to use their
clinical judgment in treating the ills of patients has long been
recognized as part of this professional domain.4 Unlike claims of
36 The discussion is about the right to life of born persons, not whether unborn
persons have a right to be born. Indeed, a higher level of procedural correctness is
required in capital punishments cases precisely because life is at stake. Although these
issues are usually framed in Eighth Amendment "cruel and unusual punishment" terms,
they share a normative bed with the "right to life" component of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Similar results could have been articulated under that clause.
37 A right to bodily integrity may also be involved, most noticeably in cases testing
the legality of seizures of the body under the Fourth Amendment. See, for example,
Schmerber v California, 384 US 757, 771-72 (1966) (compulsory blood test); Winston v
Lee, 470 US 753, 761 (1985) (surgical removal of bullet); Tennessee v Garner, 471 US 1, 3
(1985) (escaping burglar shot dead); Washington v Harper, 494 US 210, 238 (1990) (non-
consensual administration of psychotropic medication).
38 521 US 702 (1997).
39 Id at 737-38, 748-49.
40 Moore v City of East Cleveland, 431 US 494, 503 (1977).
41 Roe v Wade, 420 US 113, 153 (1973).
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rights to abortion and assisted suicide, which had to confront
extensive state restriction of those practices at the time of the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment,42  there is no
comparable tradition of legislative restriction on medical practice
until well into the twentieth century.
Medical practice was not regulated by the states in 1789 and
not much more so in 1868.4" Medical licensure began in the
1830s, spurred by the drive to oust itinerant and irregular
healers. But persons licensed to practice medicine had no
restrictions placed on clinical judgment or on the products that
they could use. The first federal drug law passed in 1914 to
control non-medical drug abuse left physicians free to prescribe
cocaine and opiates for legitimate medical purposes." The Food
and Drug Administration, founded in 1906, did not begin to
exercise pre-market approval of the safety and efficacy of drugs
and biologics until the thalidomide scandal in 1962.'
With a tradition of little or no regulation until well into the
twentieth century, one cannot point to a deeply rooted regulatory
tradition restraining medical practice as existed with abortion
and assisted suicide. This no doubt was due to the relatively
unscientific basis of most medicine and the great deference given
to professional self-regulation. Medicine, which relied heavily on
empirics, was in 1868 still ignorant of Koch's germ-theory, and
had minimally effective anesthesia and antisepsis for surgery.
Indeed, doctors relied on leeches, blistering, and bleeding well
into the late 1800s.46 Until the development of sulfa drugs and
antibiotics in the 1930s, the chance that going to a doctor would
help a patient was small. There were no ethical issues or legal
restrictions on research with human subjects until the
development of the Nuremburg Code for human experimentation
in the 1940s.47
42 Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 US 261, 294-95 (1990)
(Scalia concurring).
4 See generally, Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine 3-60
(Basic 1982).
44 Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, Pub L No 63-223, 38 Stat 785; William Butler
Eldridge, Narcotics and the Law; A Critique of the American Experiment in Narcotic
Drug Control9 (Chicago 1967); Alfred R. Lindesmith, The Addict and the Law5 (Indiana
1965).
45 Philip Hilts, Protecting America's Health: The FDA, Business, and One Hundred
Years of Regulation 158-65 (Knopf 2002).
46 Michael Bliss, Harvey Cushing: A Life in Surgery 17-18 (Oxford 2005).
47 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control
Council Law No. 10, Vol 2, 181-82 (GPO 1949), available at <http-//ohsr.od.nih.gov/
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C. The Reverse of a Right to Die
The claim of a right to medical treatment to save life and
reduce suffering might also be usefully understood as the reverse
of a right to end life by termination of treatment or assisted
suicide. The main argument against a right to die has been
protection of human life. Given the importance of the state's
interest in protecting life, it would be odd if the state were free to
adopt policies that threatened life or caused a person's death.
The claim of a right to control the timing of one's death has
been a centerpiece of substantive due process struggles beyond
issues of reproduction and sexuality. The Supreme Court first
grappled with this issue in Cruzan v Missouri Dept of Health,"
in the context of withdrawal of life-support from a person in a
persistent vegetative state. That case engaged questions of
whether an incompetent person had a right to have medical
treatment ended, and if so, whether that right extended to
advance directives to that end.49 More recently, in Washington v
Glucksberg° and Vacco v Quill,51 the Court confronted the
question of whether a competent, terminally-ill person had a
right to physician assistance in obtaining the drugs the patient
needed to end his own life. Gonzales v Oregon,52 which found
that the Attorney General lacked authority to determine
whether prescription of Schedule II drugs for assisted suicide
was a legitimate medical practice, shows another limitation on
governmental interference in end of life decisionmaking.53
Arrayed against autonomy claims to end one's life are
"culture of life" claims that such a right will undermine the
sanctity of life, violate the ethics of the medical profession, and
impair the welfare of incompetent and vulnerable patients.
While the Court has not accepted all claims, it has gone a long
way in honoring a large measure of individual and physician
discretion in these matters. Enticing dicta even suggest that
there is a right to have advance directives to terminate
guidelines/nuremberg.html> (last visited Apr 19, 2006).
48 497 US 261 (1990).
49 John A. Robertson, Cruzan and the Constitutional Status of Nontreatment
Decisions for Incompetent Patients, 25 Ga L Rev 1139, 1144-45 (1991).
5o 521 US 702 (1997).
51 521 US 793 (1997).
52 126 S Ct 904 (2006).
3 Id at 925.
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treatment honored and/or to have physician assistance in ending
life if effective pain control alternatives are not available.54
The use of safe and effective ESC-derived therapies provides
a unique twist on the theme of patient autonomy. While end-of-
life cases involve rights to bring death about, ESC treatment
involve efforts to avoid death and reduce suffering. In the former
case, opponents argue on the side of life to prevent its cessation
by individual choice or the actions of others. In the latter, they
appeal to respect for the life of embryos, while ignoring the lives
of the born persons who would benefit from such treatments.5
Although proponents of ESC treatment seek to extend life,
"culture of life" enthusiasts frame the issue as participating in a
"culture of death." They assert deontic, consequentialist, and
symbolic claims akin to those used to oppose reproductive and
sexual liberty. But life itself and freedom from severe pain and or
disability is central to all lives. The case for a negative right to
medical treatments should therefore be as strong, if not stronger,
than the case for other rights. Since the main argument against
robust autonomy at the end of life has been the need to protect
that life, it would indeed be anomalous if the state could adopt
policies that directly interfered with life and health without a
compelling justification.56
D. Limits and Scope of the Right
A negative due process right to use safe and effective
medical treatments to save life or reduce pain and suffering
plausibly follows from text, history, logic, and precedents. If due
process protects a person's life and liberty, then laws that
prohibit the prescription, application, or use of a drug, a biologic,
or a medical procedure needed to save life or reduce suffering
5 Only Justice O'Connor has spoken directly to this issue, but it would not be
surprising if other justices also found that the right to refuse medical care encompassed
some advance control over such a decision. Cruzan, 497 US at 292; Glucksberg, 521 US at
737-38. But see Robertson, 25 Ga L Rev at 1179 (cited in note 49).
'6 For an analysis of whether the state may elevate the interests of non-
constitutional persons over those of persons clearly protected by the 5th and 14th
Amendments, see Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should
be Overruled, 59 U Chi L Rev 381, 398-402 (1992).
56 Whether "culture of life" concerns with protecting all stages of human development
after fertilization constitute a compelling justification is discussed below. See also,
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs and Washington Legal
Foundation v Esehenbach, 445 F3d 470 (DC Cir 2006) (noting that the right to treatment
to extend life is implied by the right to end life by refusing treatment).
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would infringe that right. The state would then have the burden
of showing sufficiently strong grounds to justify the
infringement. One may disagree over the correct label for the
claimed right-whether it is a fundamental right or merely a
"protected liberty interest."57 One may also disagree about
whether the state must satisfy strict or intermediate scrutiny or
the more rigorous rationality assessment applied in Lawrence v
Texas.5" But whatever the precise term used, scrutiny beyond the
minimal rationality review used for economic and social
legislation should be applied to governmental interests said to
justify infringement of the claimed right to medical treatment.
As argued in the next section, none of the interests asserted in
support of such a ban justify denying a person the right to use
ESC-derived therapies to save life or to reduce pain and
disability.
Persons inclined to a large measure of deference to
legislatures will be hesitant to accept judicial articulation of a
new "right to receive medical care" because of its potentially
broad reach. It could call into question many aspects of federal or
state regulation of drugs, medical and surgical procedures, organ
transplantation, and medical licensure. A Supreme Court leery
of substantive due process lawmaking might also be reluctant to
interfere in legislative judgments about tradeoffs between
health, safety, protection of unborn human life, and patient
needs for therapy.
But several factors should modulate that fear. First, it would
not be the first time that the Court has struck down legislation
because it interfered with the life or health of a patient. The
Court's abortion jurisprudence has long refused to compromise
the woman's life or health for the sake of the fetus.59 Indeed,
even when the state may ban abortion to protect fetal interests,
it may not do so at the expense of the woman's life or health.60
Nor may it ban certain abortion techniques on grounds of
repugnancy, such as partial-birth abortion, when those
57 See Cruzan, 497 US at 278 ("[A] competent person has a constitutionally protected
liberty interest. .. ")
58 539 US 558, 577-78 (2003) (concluding that a majority's judgment that a liberty
granted by substantive due process is immoral is not sufficient in itself to proscribe that
activity).
59 Roe, 410 US at 152-53.
60 Id.
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techniques are necessary to protect the life or health of the
woman.
61
Second, nothing in a right to medical care prevents the state
from enacting regulations that are reasonably related to
protecting the health and safety of patients. The state will not
lose the power to guard patient health and safety through drug
approval, medical licensure, and other regulatory efforts. It will
simply have to present a stronger justification to do so.
Third, recognition of such a right would not itself empower
health care professionals to claim greater rights than they
previously had. Justice Blackmun's broad language of doctor and
patient rights opened the door to such claims in the late 1970s.6 2
It soon became clear, however, that doctors' rights derived from
the patient's right to choose treatment. Similarly, a right to
receive medical treatment might lead to doctors' claiming rights
in the name of patients, but it would not in itself clothe doctors
with an independent right to be free of state regulation.
Finally, recognition of such a right will invalidate legislation
only if a law that infringes a patient's right to treatment lacks
substantial justification. In some cases, alternatives will exist; in
others, the health and safety justification will be easily
established. The existence of adequate alternatives, for example,
could dispose of claims that the federal Controlled Substances
Act,63 which lists both heroin and marijuana as drugs with no
accepted medical uses, is an unconstitutional interference with
the right to pain relief.'
6' Stenberg v Carhart, 530 US 914, 929-30 (2000). The Supreme Court will revisit the
issue in Gonzales v Planned Parenthood, 546 US _ (2006) (does Congress have the
power to make medical findings that partial birth abortion is never needed to protect a
woman's health). The case will also give Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito the
opportunity to tip their hand on abortion issues. Culture of life enthusiasts refuse to
swallow the health exception pill because they fear that it will open the door to "abortion
on demand" because abortion is generally safer than childbirth. If the Court continues to
adhere to the need for a health exception, see, for example, Ayotte v Planned Parenthood
of North New England, 546 US - (2006), laws that restrict the use of safe and effective
ESC therapies may also be in doubt. See also Planned Parenthood Cincinnati Region v
Taft, 439 F3d 304 (6th Cir 2006) (state law restricting RU-486 abortion pill invalid
because would impose significant risk on woman's health in off-label use situations).
62 Roe, 410 US at 152-53.
6 21 USC § 812.
64 Advocates of medical marijuana argue that the federal ban is unconstitutional
because alternative treatments are not adequate, such as the case of Angel Raich, who
asserts that only cannabis can relieve her excruciating pain and counter her life-
threatening wasting disorder. Appellants' Opening Brief, pp 6-7. Raich v Gonzalez, 545
US 1 (2005).
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Still, recognition of a right to medical treatment could call
into question regulatory policies in areas as diverse as organ
transplantation, control of chronic pain, cancer therapy, and the
use of fetal tissue.65 As a general proposition, courts should defer
to legislative oversight, but judicial deference need not mean
judicial withdrawal from the field. Courts do have a role in
policing the boundary between an individual's life or liberty and
legislative authority.6 6 Although legislatures are competent to
resolve many issues of medical and health care policy, their
authority should be limited when they have only minimally
rational grounds for preventing patients from obtaining safe and
effective medical treatments. 7
III. STATE INTERESTS IN BANNING ESC-DERIVED THERAPIES
Having established the case for a presumptive negative right
to medical treatment, I turn to the sufficiency of governmental
interests relied on to limit ESC treatments. Three sets of
interests have dominated the debate. First, there is a regulatory
interest in the safety and efficacy of ESC treatments. Second,
and by far the most important, there is the embryo status
issue-the belief that a protected human individual exists from
the time of fertilization and should be protected. The third is a
set of concerns or fears that ESC will produce a slide down a
slippery slope toward more abusive or repugnant practices, such
as reproductive cloning and genetic engineering of offspring.
Legislatures are ordinarily best situated to assess those
interests; there are good institutional reasons to be wary of
strenuous judicial oversight. As noted, however, courts should
not refuse their constitutional duty to review the allocation of
authority between government and individuals on basic
65 An aggressive federal enforcement policy, for example, deters some doctors from
prescribing the most effective means of pain relief. Timothy E. Quill and Diane E. Meier,
The Big-Chill-Inserting the DEA into End-of-Life Care, 354 N Eng J Med 1, 1-3 (2006);
Beth Weinman, Freedom from Pain, 24 J Leg Med 495, 508-11 (2003); Lars Noah,
Challenges in the Federal Regulation of Pain Management Technologies, 31 J Law, Med
& Ethics 55-74 (2003).
66 See Laurence C. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Rules in the Due Process of
Life and Law, 87 Harv L Rev 1, 10-11 (1973) (arguing that the Court, in Roe, was not just
balancing abortion versus continued pregnancy, but also balancing "alternative
allocations of decisionmaking authority").
67 Some cases may not be easily resolved, as in the dog torture hypothetical discussed
below at notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
[2006:
1] EMBRYO CUL TURE AND THE "CULTURE OF LIFE" 17
questions of life and health.6" When measured against the
traditional compelling interest standard or a post-Lawrence
invigorated rational basis test, none of the asserted state
interests is sufficiently robust to justify the health loss to
individuals denied safe and effective ESC therapies.
A. Health and Safety: The Role of the FDA
A finding that the life and liberty clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments protect a right to receive medical
treatment does not mean that the FDA or other agencies cannot
regulate such a right in the interest of the health and safety of
patients and the community. No claimant of the right to use
ESC-derived treatments argues otherwise.69
They would be on very weak ground if they did. In 1979, the
Supreme Court put to rest the idea that a right to medical
treatment or pain relief exempts regulatory review in a case
brought by proponents of laetrile for terminally ill cancer
patients.7" The government took the position that laetrile was a
"drug" subject to the federal labeling and approval requirements
administered by the FDA. With the threat of federal enforcement
looming, several states authorized the use of laetrile within their
own borders.7
In United States v Rutherford,72 the Supreme Court upheld
the requirement of FDA approval of drugs for terminally ill
cancer patients who had no other options. It found that laetrile, a
derivative of apricot pits and almonds, was subject to FDA
approval for health and safety just as other drugs and biologics
were.73 Terminal illness did not lessen a person's interest in
avoiding toxic treatments nor in being sold "remedies" that had
68 See Tribe, 87 Harv L Rev at 10 (cited in note 66).
69 Similarly, proponents of a right to physician-assisted suicide concede that the state
might legitimately limit its exercise to situations of terminal illness, medical confirmation
of the prognosis, waiting periods, and other regulations to ensure that only competent
persons have freely chosen assisted suicide. The Oregon Death With Dignity Act, Or Rev
Stat § 127.800 et seq (2003), at issue in Gonzales v Oregon, 126 S Ct 904 (2006), is typical
of a proceduralist approach to assisted suicide.
70 United States vRutherford, 442 US 544, 550-51 (1979).
71 In the laetrile controversy, the FDA ceded control of intrastate use to the states.
See generally, Note, Laetrile: Statutory and Constitutional Limitations on the Regulation
of Ineffective Drugs, 127 U Pa L Rev 233 (1978-79). Under Gonzales v Reich, 125 S Ct
2195, 2209 (2005), Congress could assign control of intrastate use to the FDA, if it has not
already done so.
72 442 US 544 (1979).
73 Id at 551.
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no efficacy.7 4 Just as terminally ill persons were later found in
Glucksberg to have no right to physician-assisted suicide,75 so
Rutherford implicitly found that they did not have the right to
ineffective and untested therapies.7" Left untouched in that case,
however, was a rights claim to use medical treatments that are
safe and effective under standard FDA criteria.77
Few ESC proponents question the necessity of FDA
involvement in regulating ESC use, paternalistic though it may
be.7" Indeed, they desire it so that ESC therapies are not used
prematurely or without proven benefit to patients. Snake-oil
salesmen exist with every new technology.79 The need for public
review is as great now as it has ever been. Thus ESC-derived
therapies will have to meet the same demands of safety and
efficacy that any drug or biologic maker must meet-including a
license to conduct clinical research and proof of a favorable ratio
of patient benefits to toxicity.
80
It may be naive, however, to expect that FDA review of the
safety and efficacy of ESC products will be untainted by "culture
of life" influence. The FDA has traditionally relied on scientific
and clinical data, not politics, in making its judgments. As the
"culture of life" has gained political ascendancy in Washington,
however, the FDA's record of independence has been tarnished.
The most glaring case has been the agency's refusal to approve
74 Id at 557-58.
75 Glucksberg, 521 US at 745.
76 See Rutherford, 442 US at 551 (grounding the holding on FDA authority).
77 Although the district court in Rutherford also found that the law infringed a
patient's right to treatment, both the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court addressed
only the question of FDA authority. Rutherford, 442 US at 551. But see Andrews v
Ballard, 498 F Supp 1038, 1039 (S D Tex 1980) (finding that refusal to license
acupuncturists violates a patient's right to medical treatment); Abigail Aliance v
Eschenbach, 445 F3d 470 (DC Cir 2006) (noting that the right to life may include right of
terminally ill patients to use post-Phase I investigational drugs).
78 Market libertarians such as Milton Friedman have argued that food and drug
safety agencies such as the FDA should be abolished. Milton Freedman, Capitalism and
Freedom 35 (Chicago 1962).
79 Doctors and clinics in India, China, and Portugal have claimed a high success rate
with adult stem cells, despite any good evidence that injecting adult or hematopoietic
stem cells for spinal cord injuries, Parkinson's disease, or other ailments works. See Joyce
Howard Price, Stem-cell Ambivalence, The Washington Times (Jan 9, 2005), available at
<http'//washingtontimes.com/specialreport/20050lO9-120809-5421r.htm> (last visited
Apr 20, 2006) (discussing desperate patient's turn to Portugal and China for expensive
treatments based on advances in stem cell research); Randeep Ramesh, Row Over
Doctors' Miracle' Cures: West Urges Curb on Indian Clinic's Untested Treatment, The
Guardian 17 (November 18, 2005).
80 ESC treatments could take the form of progenitor cells that are introduced into the
body or small molecules that block pathogenic pathways.
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non-prescription sales of Plan B, an emergency contraceptive,
because of the possibility that the product might prevent
implantation of fertilized eggs or encourage promiscuity."1
Despite near unanimous advisory committee approval of the
benefits from over-the-counter sales of Plan B, the Commissioner
of the FDA refused to approve it, disingenuously issuing a notice
for further comment and rulemaking instead. 2
Continued "culture of life" dominance of the FDA does not
bode well for ESC-derived therapies. A "culture of life" movement
that has final say over whether ESC products are safe and
effective enough to be used in practice will be sorely tempted to
obstruct their use. The power of ESC therapy should eventually
win out, but it will take longer and require more political capital
than FDA decisions usually do.
B. Embryo Status Issues
The key to the ESC debate, of course, is the profound
disagreement that surrounds the moral status of the embryo.
The issue concerns when duties to new human entities attach-
when an individual becomes, or the state might legitimately
regard it as, a rights-bearing entity. Persons firmly within the
"culture of life" camp, who believe that fertilized eggs and
blastocysts are new persons or human lives from fertilization,
will not accept destroying embryos to obtain ESCs to save born
lives, even if the embryos to be used will never be placed in a
uterus.' In addition, persons who view the embryo as too
rudimentary in development to have rights or interests have no
81 See GAO, Food and Drug Administration: Decision Process to Deny Initial
Application for Over-the-Counter Marketing of the Emergency Contraceptive Drug Plan
B was Unusual (Nov 2005), available at <httpJ/www.gao.gov/new.items/d06109.pdf> (last
visited Mar 15, 2006) (detailing the FDA's denial of over-the-counter access to plan B);
Meredith Waldman, US Watchdog Finds Bias Against Morning-After Pill, 438 Nature
401 (2005) (describing the FDA's response to the GAO report). Note also the case of
Norplant, the implantable contraceptive, and RU-486 (mifipristone) used to produce non-
surgical abortions. Consider Karen F. Richards, Case Note, RU 486: A Promising Birth
Control Device Entangled in the Abortion Debate, 6 J Pharmacy & Law 117 (1996)
(discussing how the political opposition to RU 486 influenced the FDA's hesitation to
approve the drug for use as a contraceptive, despite the drug's promise).
82 The Director of the FDA's Division of Women's Health, Dr. Susan Woods, resigned
in protest of the politicization of the decision. Marc Kaufman, FDA Official Quits Over
Delay on Plan B, Wash Post A08 (Sept 1, 2005).
83 As President Bush put it, "I do not believe in the destruction of life in order to save
life." Remarks by President George W. Bush on Stem Cell Research (Aug 9, 2001),
available at <http'//www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200/08/20010811-1.html> (last
visited Apr 19, 2006).
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rights-based objection, but they might choose to protect embryos
as a symbolic expression of "special respect" for human life
generally. 4
One's position on the moral status of the embryo determines
where one stands in the "culture of life" versus "culture of death"
debate. The arguments on either side are so well-known that
there is little need to rehash them here. Yet the resistance of the
issue to rational solution justifies some mention of recent themes
in the discussion. Most notable here has been the Leon Kass-led
President's Council on Bioethics' engagement with the issue in
its reports on human cloning and ESCs.8  It is worth looking at
their account to refresh our recollection about the structure of
the argument and key points of difference.
1. Membership in the human community.
Most striking in the Council's reports is its rhetorical shift
from "potentiality" to "continuity" and "membership in the
human community." Past pro-life argumentation had
emphasized potentiality. The Council focused instead on the
continuity of individual members of the human community from
their first embryonic stages through implantation, gestation,
birth, youth, maturity, and senescence. Although no substance is
added by this word shift, appeal to fertilization as a stage that
we all experienced/underwent in our life histories carries a
powerful rhetorical charge. It also is blatantly essentialist.
Simply because a collection of living cells has human DNA it is to
be accorded all the rights and moral and legal status accorded to
born individuals.8"
The Council's reports, however, do not provide any argument
for why the characteristic of human DNA per se confers rights
84 For the original use of "special respect" see American Fertility Society, Ethical
Considerations of Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 62 Fertility and Sterility 33S
(1994) (Supplement 1).
85 President's Council on Bioethics, Human Cloning and Human Di'gnity (2002);
President's Council on Bioethics, Monitoring Stem Cell Research at 58-60 (cited in note
3).
86 Professor Robert George has been an active proponent of this variant on the
potentiality argument. As he puts it, "the embryo is a whole living member of the species
homo sapiens at the earliest stage of his or her natural development" and that the
hydatiform mole or teratoma (collection of cells) is not a whole living member of the
species at any developmental stage because "[sluch entities lack the internal resources to
actively develop themselves to the next more mature stage of the life of a human being."
President's Council on Bioethics, Human Cloning and Human Dignity at 258-59 (cited in
note 85).
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and imposes duties. It is not obvious why a multi-celled entity
with particular DNA has rights which other mammals, including
primates that share 98.5% of human genes and sentience, do not.
It appears then that the Council, like other holders of a strict
pro-life position, still relies on some version of a potentiality
argument, though they do not address it as such.
The potentiality argument, however, overlooks the fact that
rights and interests are ordinarily assigned on the basis of actual
characteristics, not potential alone.87 There is strong debate
about what those characteristics are, with birth, consciousness,
sentience, sense of identity, rationality, or some other
characteristics put forth as candidates.88  Animal rights
advocates, by contrast, in arguing against specism, rely almost
exclusively on sentience as the key characteristic.89 Whatever the
characteristic chosen, all of them depend on some degree of
development beyond undifferentiated cells that lack organs, a
body, or a functioning neurological system. Moreover, the
embryos used as a source for ESCs will otherwise be discarded,
thus having a vanishingly small chance of ever producing those
other characteristics.'
When pushed further, the Council's position, like many
potentiality arguments, backs on to a consequentialist appeal to
the bad consequences for born humans if all post-fertilization
87 Dan Brock, Is a Consensus Possible on Stem Cell Research? Moral and Political
Obstacles, 32 J Med Ethics 36, 38 (2006); Michael J. Sandel, Embryo Ethics-The Moral
Logic of Stem-Cell Research, 351 N Eng J Med 207 (2004); Louis Guenin, Morals and
Primordials, 292 Science 1659, 1659-60 (2001) (considering the principled basis of the
position that killing an embryo is always wrong).
88 The Supreme Court in Roe and Casey drew the line at viability-the ability to
survive outside of the womb-but never gave more than the definition of viability for its
position. If it had, it might have argued that viability is a rough marker for when
substantial neurological development, possibly even sentience, has occurred, thus
providing a less subjective, moral-religious reason for state protection.
89 Their recognition of sentience as the ground for having interests and rights then
leads them to argue that any living organism that is sentient, as other mammals appear
to be, also has interests that should be respected. Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 1-25
(Random House 1975); Thomas Regan, The Case For Animal Rights (University of
California Press 2004). But see Taimie L. Bryant, Animals Unimodifled: Defining
Animals/Defining Human Obligations to Animals, 2006 U Chi Legal F 137, 165 (arguing
that animal rights' activists who premise their arguments on sentience draw an arbitrary
line, thereby excluding from protection "a vast number of beings whose existence is
completely intertwined with those on the other side of the line").
90 The Council's counterargument is that the decision to discard or not place in a
uterus is an act of human will, which could be made differently. President's Council on
Bioethics, Monitoring Stem Cell Research at 84-90 (cited in note 3). This response begs
the question of whether those embryos would have been created if all had to be
transferred to a uterus.
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stages of human life are not treated equally. The
continuity/human community argument in Monitozing Stem Cell
Research clearly shows this reliance on consequentialism.9' As
Leon Kass puts it elsewhere, "no decent society can afford to
treat human life, at whatever stage of development, as a mere
natural resource to be mined for the benefit of others,"
presumably because of the effects which it will have on that
society. 9
2
Viewed in consequentialist terms, however, the pro-lifers
again have not made a case that such dire consequences will
ensue. It is the barest of slippery slope arguments, wanting flesh
to be taken seriously. Its proponents assert possible dire
consequences but provide no account, much less evidence for, the
sequence of how such a result will come about. Nor do they show
why the mere risk of such consequences outweighs the loss to
patients denied ESC treatments.
In a different context, greater patient and family control
over termination of treatment has apparently led to little abuse
or neglect. Courts, for example, have upheld the right of parents
to insist on futile treatment for anencephalic infants, and
standard proposals for physician-assisted suicide include
protections against discrimination and involuntary choice.9"
Because ESC therapies are sought to extend life, it is difficult to
see how using undifferentiated ESCs that never will implant in a
uterus will harm post-birth human life, much less to the degree
necessary to justify depriving born persons of the benefits those
treatments might provide.
2. Institutional competence in determining the value of
prenatal life.
It is a truism of constitutional law that legislatures are
better situated than courts to make judgments about the
acceptability of policy tradeoffs. Despite a presumption of
deference to legislatures, a residual role for the courts remains
91 Id at 76-77. The report notes: "Nonetheless, advocates of the argument from
continuity suggest that it is dangerous to begin to assign moral worth on the basis of the
presence or absence of particular capacities and features, and that instead we must
recognize each member of our species from his or her earliest days as a human being
deserving of dignified treatment." Id at 78.
92 Leon Kass, A Way Forward on Stem Cells, Wash Post A21 (July 12, 2005).
93 In reBabyKA 832 F Supp 1022 (4th Cir 1993); Or Rev Stat § 127.800 et seq (2003);
Americans with Disabilities Act 42 USC §12182 (2002).
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based on their competency in principled reasoning about basic
rights from text, history, and precedent about the meaning of
open-ended textual clauses. In the throes of politics, legislatures
may overlook more basic values and disregard minority
interests. Asking legislatures to meet a more robust standard of
justification than mere rationality is proper when public policies
infringe protected individual interests in life and liberty.
Something more than consequentialist speculation or essentialist
moral beliefs about embryos should be shown to justify barring
patient access to safe and effective ESC treatments.
Variations on this point have long animated the abortion
debate. But there the question has focused on the moral status of
implanted embryos and fetuses. Whatever the strength of
arguments to limit abortion of implanted fetuses, the
preimplantation embryo has no nervous system, no organs, and
no differentiated cells beyond a trophoblastic layer forming the
placenta, much less sentience or consciousness. Even if
transferred to the uterus, few embryos will implant. Nor is there
a uterus available to accept every embryo. Assignment of legal
rights to such undeveloped entities on the basis of human DNA
and developmental potential alone is not a justifiable ground for
denying born persons safe and effective medical treatments.94
In fact all justices in Roe v Wade95 and Casey v Planned
Parenthood6 agreed that fetuses are not "persons" within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 97 Those who question
the legitimacy of Roe seek to empower government to impose
greater regulation on abortion, not to have fetuses treated in all
regards as persons protected by the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments. As a result, there is no constitutional duty to treat
pre-natal life equally with post-natal life.
94 Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973).
95 Id.
505 US 833 (1992).
97 By contrast, the German Constitutional Court has held that fetuses are protected
by Article I of the Basic Law which protects "the right to life of all persons." However, it
has also found that a person's "right of free development of personality" gives them a
right to pre-viability abortions in circumstances remarkably similar to those recognized
in Casey. John A. Robertson, Reproductive Technologies in Germany and the United
States: An Essay in Comparative Law and Bioethics, 43 Colum J Transnatl L, 191, 196-
202 (2004). The German Court has not yet held that that protection also extends to
fertilized eggs and pre-implantation embryos, though embryos are protected by
legislation. Id at 195, 205. This protection bars the destruction of embryos to obtain
ESCs. However, ESCs derived legally outside of Germany before January 1, 2002 may be
imported for research. Id at 212-21.
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The constitutional question in Roe, however, is not whether
the state must protect pre-natal life, but whether it may choose
to do so if it wishes. If born persons but not fetuses and embryos
have Fourteenth Amendment rights, then the state should not be
free to protect the latter at the expense of the life or health of
born persons.98 Government might convey its views of the
importance of all stages of human life by funding decisions and
regulation, but it cannot do so by denying safe and effective
medical treatment without a stronger justification than an
essentialist ipse dixit about the inherent rights of embryos.9 9 If
moral repugnance is not an acceptable basis for denying a person
sexual intimacy or reproductive freedom, it should not justify
denying the right to life and health on which sexual freedom and
the exercise of other liberties depend.0 0
If this is true, then the state might also be limited in the
steps it might take to protect the welfare of non-human animals.
Consider a law that banned animal use practices that
substantially interfered with the ability to discover or produce
drugs or therapies essential to life or health.'0 ' Such a law could
be found to infringe a person's right to life and health because it
bans a needed precursor activity to providing safe and effective
medical care. 0 2 If so, the state's justification for such a ban
should be strictly scrutinized. Whether the interest in preventing
suffering in sentient, non-human animals was compelling
enough to justify a particular law's burden on patients would
require a close analysis of the competing human and animal
interests at stake, alternative ways of protecting those interests,
98 Dworkin, 59 U Chi L Rev at 400-01 (cited in note 55). Justice Samuel Alito has
objected to the term constitutional person to distinguish born persons who are protected
from unborn humans which are not as "fortunate." Alexander v Wi tman, 114 F3d 1392,
1409 (3d Cir 1997) (Alito concurring) (finding that state exclusion of stillborn fetuses from
wrongful death and survival statutes does not violate constitutional rights of fetuses or
parents).
99 The essentialist nature of the embryo protectionist position may also distinguish
the interest in preventing suffering to sentient non-human animals.
100 The right claimed is thus independent of the right to terminate pregnancy. While
reversal of Roe v Wade would allow states to prefer fetal interests over a woman's choice,
it would not necessarily extend to early embryos that have not yet implanted in the
uterus.
101 1 am indebted to Jordan Steiker for this hypothetical. See generally Martha
Nussbaum, The Frontiers of Justice: Nationality, Disability, Species (Harvard 2006)
(showing that the social contract tradition, despite its great insights, cannot handle the
moral boundary between humans and animals).
102 There are important parallels here to the precursor basis for a first amendment
right to research that is discussed in Part IV.
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consistency with other practices regarding animals, and other
factors. While overbroad bans might be found unconstitutional,
the state may be free to use more narrowly tailored means to
restrict certain uses of sentient animals in medical research or
treatment despite a reduced availability of therapy. Depending
on the facts of the situation, a ban on use of animals in research
might be valid while a ban on use of embryos would not be. l10
3. An Equal Protection approach.
Those persons uncomfortable with the Court's normativizing
in substantive due process cases may prefer that they make such
moves in the plain(er) clothes of the Equal Protection Clause.10 a
Equal protection analysis, however, is never free of the
normative choices that underlay a due process approach.105
Because those choices are not as immediately center-stage,
however, some persons find an equal protection approach more
neutral. 106
Equal protection, if only fitfully, draws on notions of moral
consistency. "Culture of life" enthusiasts, however, are not
consistent in their protection of embryos and born life. They
argue that fertilized eggs and embryos deserve all the rights of
other human beings, but then do not mourn the loss of embryos
and fetuses in the same way or impose the same degree of
liability for their destruction.' v Nor do they campaign actively
103 Unlike sentient animals, embryos are not yet differentiated into organs or a
nervous system, and thus cannot suffer. National Institutes of Health, Report of the
Human Embryo Research Panel, Bethesda, MD:NIH (1994).
104 Some readers may catch the allusion to my colleague Larry Sager's investigation of
the partnership and agency aspects of our constitutional practice in his elegant work,
Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plainclothes: A Theory ofAmerican Constitutional Practice
(Yale 2004). See also Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lawrence, 539 US at 579 (arguing
for the result on equal protection grounds because of the state's failure to ban
heterosexual sodomy while banning it by gays).
'05 Bolling v Sharp, 347 US 497 (1954) is the locus classicus, finding an equal
protection component in the Fifth Amendment's due process clause. See id (school
segregation in the District of Columbia violates due process). See also Peter Westen, The
Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv L Rev 537 (1982).
106 Thus Justice Scalia, after decrying the lack of expertise in judges to determine
values at the end of life, proclaimed that "our salvation against arbitrary government
action" lay in the equal protection clause. Cruzan v Director, Department of Health, 497
US 261, 300-301 (1990) (Concurring opinion).
107 Brock, 32 J Med Ethics at 37-38 (cited in note 87). The homicide liability for
culpable destruction of fetuses that now exists in 30 or more states in most cases does not
extend to previable fetuses, much less to preimplantation embryos. Nor are embryo
protectionists likely in a pinch to save 100 embryos rather than one child, for example, if
a lab fire presented that dilemma. Id at 38 (citing Michael Sande).
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for restrictions on the large number of embryos routinely created
and discarded in assisted reproduction. People undergoing
infertility treatment typically fertilize all healthy eggs even if
only one or two will be transferred or fewer still will implant,
with the rest frozen before eventual discard. Efforts to limit this
practice would most certainly run afoul of rights of procreative
liberty.'l 8 If there is a right to create and discard embryos to
achieve pregnancy, then a fortiori the right to create and destroy
embryos to stay alive and reduce pain and disability should also
be recognized.
4. Non-embryonic alternatives.
Proposals to find non-embryonic sources of pluripotent stem
cells do not escape the constitutional problems identified here.
Some embryo protectionists suggest that viable ESCs could be
derived from eight-celled blastomeres, from dead mosaic
embryos, from turning off implantation genes in putative
embryos, and other sources that do not require destruction of
embryos. °9 If they can convince fellow protectionists that the
biologic entities in question lack the developmental potential
that warrants respect for the lives of embryos, they must then
show that equally good ESCs can be obtained from these non-
embryonic sources. Since no studies have indicated that this is
possible, much research lies ahead to establish the viability of
non-embryonic alternatives. Unless the cost and functional
equivalency of non-embryonic sources of ESCs can be shown, this
attempt to finesse the issue will not succeed.
Funding some research toward non-embryonic sources of
ESCs may be justified, but refusing to fund or banning ESC
therapy pending the outcome of those investigations betrays the
delaying strategy intended by backers of such alternatives. The
pursuit of embryo alternatives drains researcher attention and
effort from the harder questions of ESC science that must be
10s The tradeoff is the added intrusion and cost to the woman versus avoiding the
destruction of embryos by limiting the number that are created or discarded. See John A.
Robertson, Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies 107-09
(Princeton 1994) (exploring constitutional issues surrounding the decision to discard
embryos); John A. Robertson, Protecting Embryos and Burdening Women: Assisted
Reproduction in Italy, 19 Human Reproduction 1693-96 (2004) (exploring the tradeoff
calculus).
109 President's Council on Bioethics, White Paper: Alternative Sources of Human
Pluripotent Stem Cells (2005).
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answered to obtain safe and effective therapies. 110 Without proof
of equal efficacy the theoretical prospect of non-embryonic
alternatives does not justify a bar on ESC treatments sourced
from true embryos.
C. Slippery Slope Consequentialism
I have already referred to the consequentialist basis of the
continuity-of-life position in the embryo status debate.
Opponents of ESC research and therapy are sometimes more
specific. They assert that the creation and destruction of ESCs,
particularly through nuclear transfer cloning to obtain ESCs
compatible for therapy, will necessarily pitch us on to a slippery
slope toward reproductive cloning and other genetic horribles.
Avoidance of that possibility, they argue, justifies prohibition of
ESC treatments for those who could presently benefit from
them.111
Some slippery slope opponents of ESC therapy focus on
treatments that involve nuclear transfer cloning. They argue
that once the technical skills to transfer nuclei from somatic to
germ cells are developed, it will be relatively simple to transfer
cloned embryos to the uterus for reproductive cloning. 1 2 They
foresee a resulting unstoppable demand for cloned children.
The common-sense response to that fear, as with any
slippery slope argument, is to deny that there is a slope at all,
much less that it is so slippery that no stopping point exists short
of a slide down the reproductive mountain to cloned children.
This response denies both that doing X in the present will
inexorably lead to doing Y in the future and that a future Y is so
unpalatable that preventing its feared occurrence justifies the
loss of present benefits from X.
110 Douglas A. Melton, George Q. Daley, and Charles G. Jennings, Altered Nuclear
Transfer in Stem Cell Research-A Flawed Proposal, 351 New Eng J Med 27-28 (2004).
111 Consider Leon R. Kass and Daniel Callahan, Cloning's Big Test: Ban Stand, New
Republic 10 (Aug 6, 2001); President's Council on Bioethics, Human Cloning and Human
Dignity(2002) (cited in note 85).
112 Dr. Hwang Suk Woo and his Korean team were thought to have shown that it is
simply a matter of acquiring the manual dexterity needed for transplanting cellular
nuclei and cytoplasm requires. Reared in the use of steel chopsticks, Hwang's team
appeared to have become more quickly adept in immunosurgery and the
micromanipulation of nuclei and cytoplasm than westerners. Exposure of Dr. Hwang's
false claims of cloning 10 lines of ESCs shows that US researchers may not be as far
behind as thought. See Wade and Sang-Hun, Human Cloning Was All Faked, NY Times
at Al (cited in note 14) (reporting the revelation that Dr. Hwang Suk Woo's claims were
indeed fraudulent).
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If reproductive cloning is perceived as so horrible, there is no
reason why a criminal ban on transfer of cloned embryos to a
uterus would be any less likely to discourage its use than the
line-drawing that occurs in myriad areas of law and policy."'
Indeed, realistic scenarios of great demand for reproductive
cloning are very hard to conjure. No primate has yet been cloned,
mammalian success rates are low, and there is a high incidence
of defects and anomalies due to the epigenetic flaws that
reprogramming differentiated cells engender."4 An otherwise
fertile person will seldom have a rational interest in cloning
herself rather than in reproducing sexually. Nor would such a
desire have a strong claim to protection as an aspect of
procreative freedom." 5 Even most gametically infertile persons
are unlikely to have the desire or be willing to spend the money
to clone themselves. The speculative fear that some unknown
amount of reproductive cloning might occur if we allow ESC
cloning for research or therapy is hardly a sufficient basis for
denying persons the present ability to use safe and effective ESC
treatments.
Yet Leon Kass and Daniel Callahan persist in spinning a
web of cloning skullduggery." 6 They assert that a criminal ban
could not be effectively enforced because monitoring of
laboratories is not practicable, and inspection alone could not tell
whether any person was in fact a clone. They also argue that
once research embryos exist, someone will be tempted to have
them implanted, thus producing a cloned child."7 Also, persons
who believe that it is morally wrong to destroy embryos created
by fertilization or nuclear transfer might not comply with a law
113 One is reminded of Justice White's observation in Griswold v Connecticut that it is
irrational for the state to expect a person to comply with a ban on contraception in
marital relations but not in adulterous ones. Griswold, 381 US 479, 505 (1965) (White
concurring).
114 Falures In Primate Cloning May Signal Impossibi'ty Of Human Reproductive
Cloning, available at <httpJ/www.sciencedaily.com/ releases/2003/04/030411070915.htm>
(last visited Feb 16, 2006) (describing the problems experienced in attempted primate
cloning).
115 John A. Robertson, Two Models of Human Cloning, 27 Hofstra L Rev 609, 618-24
(1999); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to Offspring in Assisted
Reproduction, 30 Am J L & Med 7, 39-40 (2004).
116 Kass and Callahan, Cloning's Big Test, New Republic at 10 (cited in note 111). See
also Alexander Morgan Capron, Placing a Cloning Moratorium on Research Cloning to
Ensure Effective Control Over Reproductive Cloning, 53 Hastings L J 1057 (2001-02)
(proposing an international moratorium on human cloning).
117 Kass and Callahan, Cloning's Big Test, New Republic at 10 (cited in note 111).
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that orders destruction of a cloned human embryo.118 For them,
the risk of the existence of even one cloned person is a sufficient
evil to stop all research on cloning.119
As Fred Schauer has argued, appeals to slippery slopes as a
basis for policy operate as a kind of pre-commitment device to
guard against future deciders assessing the merits of a situation
differently than present deciders do. 2' Although future
decisionmakers may be acting rationally once that future occurs,
a Time 1 policy based on slippery slope fears prevents such a
choice from being made at Time 2. Like other preemptive pre-
commitments, avoidance of a slippery slope forecloses the need to
make a future decision on an issue by removing the chance that
a need for that decision will ever arise.'2'
Slippery slope appeals may rationally serve present values
but they do so at a cost in both present and future interests that
is all too rarely factored into the decisional calculus. The appeal
of present assessment over a future reevaluation of the question
will depend on the situation or context at issue and the costs of
foregoing the challenged procedures. 22 Chief Justice Rehnquist
in Glucksberg quite rationally cited "the fear that permitting
assisted suicide will start down the path to voluntary and
perhaps even involuntary euthanasia" thus constituting "a much
broader license, which could prove extremely difficult to police
and contain," as one of several acceptable bases for Washington's
prohibition on physician-assisted suicide. 123 He concluded that,
"Washington, like most other States, reasonably ensures against
this risk by banning, rather than regulating, assisted suicide." 24
Rational slippery slope concerns also figured in Justice
Souter's concurrence in the judgment in Glucksberg.2 5 He too
118 But this assumes that all embryos have a right to be implanted in a woman, even
if there is no willing recipient to receive them. Guenin, 292 Science at 1659-60 (cited in
note 87).
119 Kass and Callahan, Cloning's Big Test New Republic at 10 (cited in note 111).
120 Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 Harv L Rev 361, 362-64 (1985). See also
Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 Harv L Rev 1026, 1102-03
(2003) (discussing the persistence of the is-ought fallacy despite its illogical quality).
121 John A. Robertson, Precommitments in Bioethics, 81 Tex L Rev 1849-76 (2003)
(distinguishing precommitments that remove the possibility of a different choice at Time
2).
122 Schauer recognizes the context-laden nature of evaluation of slippery slope
arguments. Schauer, 99 Harv L Rev at 381-83 (cited in note 120).
123 521 US at 732-33.
124 Id at 734-35.
125 Id at 785-86 (Souter concurring).
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cited a fear of progression from assisting the suicide of competent
dying persons to those who are poor, vulnerable, and less able to
exercise free choice. He feared that doctors "would abuse a
limited freedom to aid suicides by yielding to the impulse to end
another's suffering under conditions going beyond the narrow
limits" proposed in the case.126 While recognizing the contested
nature of the evidence concerning the Dutch regulatory system
for active euthanasia, the mere fact that some persons thought
that the Dutch restrictions had been violated with impunity
sufficed to sustain the rationality of the Washington ban.
Both Justice Rehnquist and Justice Souter, however, were
addressing the rationality of a slippery slope claim in
circumstances where alternative ways to control severe pain
existed. Justice Souter, and possibly even Justice Rehnquist,
would have been much more skeptical of a slippery slope
justification if stronger scrutiny were required. Just as those
fears would not have justified a ban on physician assisted suicide
when no other effective pain relief was available, neither should
they provide justification for interfering with a patient's right to
medical treatment to save life or reduce suffering.
The case for present action to prevent a slippery slope
toward reproductive cloning is weaker than the fear that
physician assisted suicide will lead to active euthanasia of
incompetent persons. Given the degree of suffering in many
medical situations at the end of life, there is a potentially large
pool of persons who might seek more active means to end their
lives. It is highly fanciful, however, to think that the temptation
to engage in reproductive cloning would be as strong, if only
because of high cost, low efficacy, and considerable doubts about
safety. With context mattering so mightily in assessing slippery
slope claims, there is little reason to think that the greater
pressure to burst normative lines in terminal illness would also
operate with reproductive cloning.
In short, the fear of a slippery slope to reproductive cloning
provides neither a compelling nor even a substantial basis for
denying people safe and effective ESC treatments. If slippery
slope arguments are rational in some circumstances, they need
more substance in other situations, such as when they are used
126 Id at 785-87 (Souter concurring), citing evidence that Dutch regulation of active
euthanasia had not prevented its extension beyond competent, terminally ill adults to
severely disabled neonates and elderly demented persons.
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to deny safe and effective ESC treatments that save life or
reduce suffering. Such fears have even less credence when based
on "post-human" fears of genetic engineering and manipulation
of the life cycle.' 27
IV. EMBRYO STATUS AND THE RIGHT TO RESEARCH
The discussion thus far has analyzed the constitutional
issues that would arise if the state banned the use of safe and
effective ESC therapies. ESC science has made great strides
since the first culture of human ESCs in 1998, and a few
treatments will soon be in clinical trials. But it is still too soon to
know what their ultimate contribution to medical science will be.
They might, for example, be more important as a means of
elucidating disease mechanisms and identifying targets for small
molecule drugs than as specific cell replacement therapies.'28 Nor
is it clear that the regulatory atmosphere will be negative when
safe and effective ESC therapy are at hand. By then, "culture of
life" debates might have shifted into other arenas or lost their
fire. While I have presented arguments for why the state could
not ban safe and effective ESC treatments, the situation is too
speculative to pursue further.
A more immediate issue is the constitutional acceptability of
bans on the research on which the growth of ESC science
depends. Some states have highly restrictive laws regarding
embryo research or nuclear transfer cloning.'29 These laws have
also been justified on grounds of protecting embryos and
127 Francis Fukuyama, Paul Lauritzen, and other anti-technologists who fear a "post-
human" future of genetic engineering of offspring and shifts in the trajectory of life and
death make such claims. The abstract and general nature of such charges, however, gives
them even less credence as a basis for infringing the right to safe and effective medical
treatment in the present. For a general discussion see Francis Fukuyama, Our
Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (Farrar, Straus and
Giroux 2002) (noting the erosion of the foundations of liberal democracy under pressure
from new concepts of humans and human rights, ultimately arguing for strong
international regulation of human biotechnology); Paul Lauritzen, Report on the Ethics of
Stem Cell Research, in President's Bioethics Council, Monitoring Stem Cell Research at
237, 257-63 (Appendix G) (cited in note 3).
128 Jamie Thomson, who first cultured human ESCs at the University of Wisconsin,
has consistently made this point. Suzanne Rust and Kathleen Gallagher, Stem Cell Work
Crosses Boundaries: UW Scientists Aim to Make Wisconsin the Epicenter of a Medical
Revolution, Milwaukee Journal Al (April 22, 2006).
129 Those bans take the form of criminal penalties for research with embryos or even
doing ESC research itself. For a list of states, see National Conference of State
Legislatures, State Embryonic and Fetal Research Laws, available at
<http'//www.ncsl.org/programs/health/ genetics/embfet.htm> (last visited Feb 14, 2006).
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preventing a slippery slope to future abuses. The attentive
reader will notice that embryo status and slippery slope
arguments have no different structure at the research than at
the therapy stage.
But whether they have a different constitutional valence
when treatment is still hypothetical is another question. In the
one case, it is the desire to use safe and effective treatments to
extend life or reduce pain and disability. In the other, it is the
desire to engage in the scientific and clinical practices that are
necessary to ascertain whether ESC therapies work. Although
the former cannot occur without the latter, the constitutional
status of the latter is much less clear than is the right to
treatment sketched above. Only if there is a right to research of
near equivalent constitutional status would the same demanding
scrutiny apply.
But that question is unresolved and, since the 1980s, largely
unexamined.130 Although a right to research has come up in the
cryptography, national security, and now bioterrorism contexts,
legitimate health and safety reasons appear to justify those
restrictions.' 3 ' Embryo and cloning research, by contrast, are
restricted because of disputes over the moral status of embryos,
not because of threats to community health or safety. Indeed,
current regulatory restrictions remind some ESC scientists of the
barriers placed in the path of Galileo, the acceptance of
Darwinism in education, and Lysenko's rejection of genetics in
the Soviet Union. 132
130 Historically, there were few restrictions on medical research before body snatching
for anatomy studies and the animals' rights-based opposition to anti-vivisectionism arose
in the early and mid 19th century. Serious policy attention to research with living human
subjects did not occur until after Nuremburg in the 1940s. It took the Tuskegee Syphilis
study revelations in the 1960s to spur legislative action. See Jay Katz, Experimentation
with Human Subjects (Russell Sage Foundation 1972) (detailing the authority of various
private and public actors in the human experimentation process). See also Barry P.
McDonald, Government Regulation or Other Abridgments' of Scientifc Research: The
Proper Scope of Judicial Review Under the First Amendment 54 Emory L J 979 (2005)
(noting a recent exposition of First Amendment issues in this area).
131 These justifications are not without dispute. See McDonald, 54 Emory L J at 103 1-
1048 (cited in note 130).
132 Irving Weissman, Stem Cell Research: Paths of Cancer Therapy and Regenerative
Medicine, 294 JAMA 1359, 1365 (2005). Whether ESC research is actually banned or just
subject to funding restrictions, many ESC scientists share those concerns. This
perception, which might discourage young scientists from entering the field or using
ESCs in experiments, call to mind the Supreme Court's view of the importance of
academic freedom: "Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and
distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to
evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will
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Whether the weakness of "culture of life" positions with
regard to ESC treatment defeats bans on ESC research will thus
depend on whether scientific research has a protected status that
would require more than a minimally rational basis for
governmental prohibition.133 If not, a paradox would exist: a
patient has a right to use an ESC treatment once developed but
no one has a right to do the research necessary to develop it.
The most cogent version of the argument for a right to
research relies on the connection between research and protected
interests in free speech and medical treatment.' Even if bans on
research do not warrant the same scrutiny as bans on
publication or treatment, they deserve some heightened scrutiny
because of the role of research in making free speech and medical
treatment possible. Science and medicine cannot advance
without research. Bans on research could stifle scientific and
medical progress as much as bans on publication.
The argument for a constitutional right to research has
several strands. It hinges first on finding that publication of
scientific speech is as protected as is political or other speech.
While that step is now uncontroversial, it would also be
necessary to find that research, information gathering, or other
activities that make protected publication possible receive
protection because of their link with publication itself.'35
Alternatively, one could argue that scientific research is an
stagnate and die." Sweezy vNew Hampshire, 354 US 234, 250 (1957).
133 McDonald, 54 Emory L J at 1087-88 (cited in note 130).
134 First Amendment traditions also gives special protection to values of academic
freedom. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin v Southworth, 529 US 217, 237
(2000); Keyishian v Board of Regents, 385 US 589, 503 (1967); Sweezy, 354 US at 250.
That freedom includes not only the right to select and judge students and faculty, but
also the right of faculty to wide freedom in teaching, research, or writing. The research
choices and methods of scientific and clinical faculty fall within the broad confines of
academic freedom. Consider David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of 'Individual' and
'Institutional' Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 L & Contemp Probs
227, 230-31 (1990). Many ESC scientists are university faculty, and many students, post-
docs and others are trained by them. The use of human embryos and ESCs is an
important area of investigation in developmental biology and clinical medicine, which
affects both the content of resulting publications and training of students.
135 Just as a ban on the sale of ink or printing presses would interfere with the right
of speech and publication, so to could a ban on research interfere with publication or
treatment. If the latter stage cannot be banned without more than minimal scrutiny,
then the precursor activity needed to make the latter stage should also receive some form
of heightened protection, even if there is no certainty that any particular research will
lead to publication or medical treatments. Compare Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976)
(holding that the First Amendment protects campaign contributions as precursor to
political speech).
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essential stage in producing the medical treatments protected by
the right to medical treatment. Some persons have even argued
that research is itself a form of protected speech.
13 6
I do not claim that any activity essential to develop medical
knowledge or otherwise obtain publishable information is as
protected as publication or treatment itself. But much scientific
publication and many clinical treatments depend on prior
research and experimentation. Indeed, the methodological
naturalism that is at the heart of science relies on
experimentation and then informing others of those results."' It
would be strange if the state could not ban scientific publication
or communication but could ban the experimentation and
research that is a necessary precursor to the protected
publication without showing a strong need for the restriction.'38
It would be equally paradoxical to find that the state could not
prohibit the use of safe and effective ESC medical treatments but
could prohibit the scientific and clinical research necessary to
determine whether they were safe and effective.' 39 In addition,
academic freedom, which the First Amendment also protects,
also recognizes some right to acquire and develop knowledge.
Rather than lurk further in these doctrinal precincts, I will
simply assume that the connection between scientific and clinical
research and the production of scientific knowledge and medical
treatment endows research, including ESC research, with some
level of protected status beyond that of general economic and
social liberties. If so, restrictions on ESC research should first be
assessed to see if they are viewpoint or content-based, that is,
whether they are aimed at preventing the development of
publishable knowledge about ESCs because of the knowledge it
136 Professor Alta Charo has argued that scientific research itself is a form of
expression that independently deserves First Amendment protection. United States
Senate, Commerce, Science, and Transportation Subcommittee on Science, Technology,
and Space, Hearing on Cloning and Women's Health (Mar 27, 2003). Holders of this view
must still contend with the content-neutral reach of legal bans on embryo or other
research. See notes 139-146 and accompanying text.
137 Methodological naturalism is the search for natural causes to explain natural
phenomena. KItzmiller v Dover Area School District, 400 F Supp 2d 707, 735 (M D Pa
2005) (teaching intelligent design theory violates the establishment clause of the First
Amendment).
138 There is an obvious analogy to news-gathering and reporter's privilege that is too
complicated to pursue further here. For a start on that analysis, see John A. Robertson,
The Scientist's Right to Research: A Constitutional Analysis, 51 S Cal L Rev 1203, 1215-
18(1978).
139 Acceptable non-content grounds of regulation would include protection of the
autonomy and safety of research subjects or the ownership of research materials.
[2006:
EMBRYO CULTURE AND THE "CULTURE OF LIFE"
would develop or the uses to which it could lead. 4 ' A viewpoint-
based restriction on ESC research would have great difficulty
overcoming the strict scrutiny applied to content-based
restrictions on publication.'
In most instances, however, the restriction at issue will be
content-neutral, applying to all research or experimentation
using those means, such as bans on the use of embryos or
animals in scientific or medical research. If so, it deserves
assessment under the same standard used by the Supreme Court
to assess non-content, non-viewpoint regulation of speech in
other areas. Although doctrinal decision rules have not
thoroughly crystallized here, in cases such as Ward v Rock
Against Racism' and Turner Broadcasting, Inc v FCC, 4 the
Supreme Court has applied a more fact-driven analysis than
minimal rational basis analysis alone would demand.'" This
approach allows courts to ask whether the state's content-
neutral interests in restricting research justify the burden
imposed on scientific speech and medical treatment. 14 5
If the intermediate scrutiny applied in non-content based
restrictions on speech is applied to scientific and medical
research, bans on embryo and ESC research will have difficulty
surviving.'4 6 Society does not act irrationally by seeking to
140 The fear would be that it would lead to creation and destruction of embryos for
research or therapy as well as to nuclear transfer cloning and related activities thought
to be harmful.
141 The fear that publication of knowledge will lead to bad uses has never been a
sufficient basis for content-based restrictions on speech. See, for example, United States v
Progressive, 467 F Supp 990, 992-95 (W D Wis 1979) (discussing how prior restraint
doctrine applies in the context of disseminating hydrogen bomb blueprints). At the very
least the danger posed would have to be imminent and publication viewed as an
incitement. Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969).
142 491 US 781 (1989).
143 512 US 662 (1994).
144 Under the narrow tailoring requirement applied in Ward, an ordinance may not
"burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's
legitimate interests." 491 US at 799. However, this does not require that the Court adopt
the less-restrictive-means approach of strict scrutiny or make it as rigorous as the
scrutiny of commercial speech regulation under Central Hudson Gas v Public Service
Commn, 447 US 557, 572 (1980).
145 See, for example, City of Erie v Paps AM, 529 US 277, 332 (2000), and Justice
Souter's demand for a more vigorous evidentiary scrutiny than was applied in Barnes v
Glen Theater, Inc, 501 US 560, 578-79 (1991).
146 This is true even if they are drafted with enough specificity to avoid the vagueness
that has doomed some past bans on embryo research. See Margaret S v Edwards, 794
F2d 994, 998-1001 (5th Cir 1986) (considering how vagueness in ban on embryo
experimentation violates due process); Lifchez v Hartigan, 735 F Supp 1361, 1373 (N D
111 1990) (asserting that vagueness in differentiating between "tests" and "experiments"
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promote a "culture of life" in medical research or by protecting
existing persons and research subjects. But it should have more
than merely rational justification for policies that directly block
research essential to obtain scientific and clinical knowledge that
could save life or reduce suffering.
An assessment of state bans on embryo research shows that
their justification is particularly weak. Such bans prohibit the
derivation of ESC cells from surplus embryos no longer needed to
treat infertility. Yet embryo protectionists find derivation or use
of ESCs in research morally objectionable because it directly
destroys a human life. No matter that the embryo's demise is
imminent and that it has not yet developed specialized cells or
organs. As the discussion of embryo status has shown, protection
of embryos is not a compelling ground for burdening a person's
life or health.'47 Nor should it be sufficient to justify placing
significant obstacles based on embryo status in the way of
developing the knowledge on which future ESC treatments may
depend.
Viewing the issue through an equal protection lens leads to
the same conclusion. Infertile couples now routinely fertilize all
eggs retrieved from hyper-stimulated ovaries, even though not
all of those which successfully fertilize will implant in a
uterus.' There is no movement to ban or limit such actions.
Indeed, limits on the number of embryos created or transferred
might so trench on the ability to get pregnant that they would
very likely infringe reproductive liberty.'49
If infertile couples are permitted to discard unwanted
embryos, no rational purpose is served by disallowing research to
occur on them before or during discard. Surely the production of
embryos for medical research is as important-or nearly as
important-as reproductive freedom. The more rigorous judicial
scrutiny of state ends and means applied under Turner
Broadcasting and Ward should invalidate laws against using
unwanted embryos for ESC research.
renders state ban on embryo research invalid).
147 See generally Parts II and III.
148 Robertson, 19 Human Reproduction at 1693-96 (cited in note 108) (exploring the
tradeoff calculus faced when deciding to produce excess embryos when preparing for
artificial reproduction or run the risk of having to repeat the procedure).
149 For example, a law that prohibited creation of more than three embryos for
infertility treatment could be found to violate a person's right to reproduce if it then led to
additional cycles of hormonal stimulation and egg retrieval to produce a pregnancy. On
the Italian law, see id.
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More specific bans on creating embryos for research through
laboratory fertilization or by nuclear transfer cloning should also
fall. 50 If research on discarded embryos is permitted, there is no
strong reason for banning their creation for research in the first
place. The embryos in question will have no chance to implant in
a uterus and are too rudimentary in form to have rights or
interests. Nor is the claim that it is worse to create them for
research credible other than as a symbolic practice to mark
respect for potential human life.
This analysis would also invalidate laws that ban nuclear
transfer cloning for research, as is now the case in seven states
and in a bill that passed the House of Representatives in 2005.''
There are important scientific and medical reasons for nuclear
transfer research-for cloning the genomic source of ESCs. A ban
on nuclear transfer cloning directly impedes the ability of
scientists to investigate important questions about biological
development that cannot be addressed without cloning. If
embryo status is insufficient to justify a ban on creating embryos
for research, it should have even less weight in justifying a ban
on creating embryos by nuclear transfer. Indeed, it is
questionable whether the products of nuclear transfer are
embryos at all, since they have not been created by fertilization
and have never produced a pregnancy or live birth.
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Nor is the risk great that research cloning will start a
slippery slope slide to reproductive cloning or the genetic
engineering of offspring characteristics that "post-human"
jeremiahs fear. Our earlier analysis has shown the weakness of
slippery slope approaches to complex problems. Speculative
fears, particularly when so many legal stopping points exist,
should have no greater weight in justifying bans on nuclear
transfer research than they would on other protected activities.
Nothing said so far would prevent the state from adopting
reasonable measures to protect the choice of couples in
determining whether their gametes and embryos are used in
150 Massachusetts enacted such a law in 2005. Mass Gen Laws Ann 1111, § 8.
151 HR 1357, 109th Cong, 1st Sess H1690 (2005).
152 See Rudolf Jaenisch, The Biology of Nuclear Cloning and the Potential of
Embryonic Stem Cells for Transplantation Therapy, in President's Council on Bioethics,
Monitoring Stem Cell Research at 385, 387-403 (Appendix N) (cited in note 3) (providing
a biological argument for therapeutic cloning). This fact might explain why a pro-life
state such as Missouri has refused to ban nuclear transfer cloning, and why
Massachusetts bans creation of embryos for research by fertilization but not by nuclear
transfer cloning. See note 21 and note 150.
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research. Informed consent, remedies for violations, and prior
review by IRBS and ESC review committees may legitimately be
required for the creation, use, and donation of embryos for
research. 153 But these are process and regulatory measures that
do not prevent creating embryos or using them in research. I
leave questions of banning payments to egg or embryo donors for
another time."M
V. A NOTE ON FEDERALISM
In recent years, federalism has figured so prominently in
constitutional debates that some mention of its implications for
regulation of ESC research and therapy is in order. Gonzales v
Raich55 has shrunk the limits on federal commerce power
imposed by United States v Lopez56 and United States v
Morrison,57 making clear that Congress may regulate local
activities because of their aggregate effect on interstate
commerce.' 8  Although states have traditionally regulated
medical practice, with the federal government playing a stronger
role in science funding and food and drug safety, the
methodological naturalism of science and clinical medicine
transcends state and even national borders. Unrestricted
availability of a treatment locally in one state could undermine
federal efforts to regulate it on a national basis.
If that is so, Congress has power under the Commerce
Clause to play an active role on either side of the ESC debate as
long as it has clearly expressed its intent to do so. 159 A different
political alignment in Congress could lead to federal laws
protecting the right of all persons to engage in ESC research and
receive ESC treatments. By the same token, a Congress driven
by "culture of life" loyalties could ban state-permitted embryo
153 National Academy of Sciences, Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell
Research (2005).
154 See Robert Steinbrook, Egg Donation and Human Embryonic Stem-Cell Research,
354 N Eng J Med 324, 324-26 (2006) (discussing ESC donation and subsequent research).
155 125 S Ct 2195 (2005) (holding that Congress has power under the commerce clause
to regulate state authorized intrastate production and use of marijuana for medical
reasons).
156 514 US 549 (1995).
... 529 US 598 (2000).
158 125 S Ct at 2205-09.
159 In Gonzalez v Oregon, the Court found that Congress had not intended to delegate
its authority to regulate medical practice affecting interstate commerce to the Attorney
General. 125 S Ct at 2215.
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research and ESC therapy on Commerce Clause grounds.
However, such bans would have to clear the First, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendment hurdles discussed in this Article. In the
end, federalism concerns may be less central to "culture of life"
debates than are substantive constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION
The impact of "culture of life" politics on the life sciences is
likely to continue for some time, with shifting political winds
sculpting new variations in the debate. One should not forget
that both sides share many premises. Both believe in the
methodological naturalism of science, the need to find better
cures, and the legitimacy of some societal oversight of science.16
Bitter differences, however, exist over the extent to which
embryos and fetal tissue may be used as tools in scientific
research and medical therapy. This has retarded the pace of ESC
science and if maintained in the future could deprive patients of
safe and effective medical treatments.
"Culture of life" and science policy debates commonly unfold
in legislative and administrative arenas (as well as cable TV and
internet blogs) with little role for the judiciary. The prospect of
treating people with cells obtained by destroying embryos has
now raised the prospect of a potential role for courts in this
important area of science policy. Regardless of whether litigation
will ever ensue, at the very least, thinking in constitutional
terms sharpens understanding of the competing interests and of
the institutional forms that regulation of science takes.
Yet no question in constitutional law is more radioactive
than overturning "culture of life" legislation on substantive due
process grounds. Still, a fair look at textual, historical, logical,
and precedential modes of constitutional argument support a
finding that a negative right to privately funded safe and
effective medical treatments exists, and that protection of
embryos or fears of slippery slopes will not justify infringement
of that right. If that is true, then some constitutional protection
should also exist for embryo and nuclear transfer cloning
160 Both market conservatives and liberals share this view. Market conservatives
want to develop and sell their products, and liberals want to save lives and relieve
suffering. Social conservatives, who see moral threats here, would limit the market. See
generally Daniel Callahan, Conservatives, Liberals, and Medical Progress, 10 New
Atlantis 3 (2005).
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research, because of the link between research, scientific
knowledge, and treatment.
I cannot predict how the ESC debate will ultimately be
resolved, but it will not be the last instance of societal fisticuffs
over the regulation of science and medicine.161 We respect, nay,
we adore, science and clinical medicine. But we also recognize
that scientists do not have total license in how they conduct their
business. The ESC debate has been another instance of whether
scientists or non-scientists will control the means of clinical
treatment and scientific research. That debate will continue
until political winds shift or ESC science renders it obsolete.
The role of the courts will continue to be a small one but
there are situations in which the judiciary might get more
involved. If restrictions on research become intolerable, then
lawsuits about rights to research will arise. Or if safe and
effective treatments are available but cannot be used, then
constitutional rights to treatment will be asserted. Both
possibilities raise the question of whether the courts will
recognize and protect substantive rights to research and
treatment. The length and quality of people's lives may depend
on their decisions.
161 For a comparative view of how different liberal societies mediate these questions
see Sheila Jasanoff, Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United
States (2005). A very different situation exists in the United States with interest groups
now allowed to contest the science on which federal health and environmental policy is
based. Wendy Wagner, Perils of Relying on Interested Parties to Evaluate Scientific
Quality, 95 Am J Pub Heath S99 (2005).
